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Is Internal Reporting Sufficient for Retaliation Protection Under Dodd-Frank? — Ambiguity
Requires Deference Be Given to the SEC, Which Says Yes.
I. Introduction
Retaliation is “[t]he act of doing someone harm in return for actual or perceived injuries or
wrongs.”1 These perceived wrongs include the acts of an employee who discloses a company’s
possible violations of the law. These persons are better known as “whistleblowers,” and, in this
day and age, “whistleblowing [has become] a fact of life that is not going away.”2
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
included Section 922(a)(h)(1) dedicated to “protection of whistleblowers,” through “prohibition
against retaliation.”3 It was designed to protect victims of retaliation for the kinds of conduct it
sought to encourage — essentially, the reporting of certain kinds of legal violations. 4 Such
protection was intended “[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system.”5 Section 922(a)(h)(1) is codified as 15
U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1) 6 and seeks to advance Dodd-Frank’s objective by providing protection
against retaliation.7
Since the enactment of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1), courts have struggled with applying it.8
One issue is whether an employee, who suffers retaliation due to his reporting of wrongdoing
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1510 (2014).
Jason M. Halper & Carrie H. Lebigre, Second Circuit Splits With Fifth Circuit Setting Up Possible
Supreme Court Review: Are Internal Whistleblowers Protected Under Dodd-Frank?
(Sept. 11, 2015), https://www.orrick.com/Events-and-Publications/Pages/Second-Circuit-Splits-WithFifth-Circuit-Setting-Up-Possible-Supreme-Court-Review.aspx.
3
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h) (2012).
4
Id.
5
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
6
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1) is also included in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Securities Exchange
Act”), as Amendment Section 21F.
7
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).
8
See, e.g., Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Systems, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640 (E.D. Wis. 2014); Banko v.
Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Dressler v. Lime Energy, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1
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internally to his company, but not to the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”), is protected
by Dodd-Frank.9 While an employee who reports directly to the SEC will be protected, when such
an employee reports only internally, the SEC will learn about the possible violations of securities
laws only after retaliatory termination of the employee, and then only if she sues.10
The issue stems from the confused relationship between subdivision (A)(iii) of 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-6(h)(1) and Dodd-Frank’s definition of “whistleblower.” 11 In its entirety, subdivision
(A)(iii) provides:
[n]o employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or
indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower in the terms
and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the
whistleblower . . . (iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 [], the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [],
including section 10A(m) of such Act [], section 1513(e) of title 18, United States
Code, and any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission.12
Read by itself, the subdivision would seem to provide protection for any protected disclosure since
it does not limit those to whom the disclosure is made. But when this subdivision is read in
conjunction with the Dodd-Frank’s definition of “whistleblower,” tension arises. The definition
requires an employee to provide “information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the
Commission[,]” referring to the SEC.13
While many district courts that have attempted to reconcile 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)
with the definition of whistleblower, only two circuit courts have spoken on this matter. The Fifth
Circuit, in Asadi v. G.E. Energy United States, L.L.C., held that in order for an employee to qualify

106532 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2015); Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71945
(S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013).
9
See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 146 (2d Cir. 2015).
10
See Asadi v. G.E. Energy United States, L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 629 (5th Cir. 2013).
11
Berman, 801 F.3d at 146.
12
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii).
13
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (emphasis added).
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for Dodd-Frank retaliation remedies, she must provide information to the SEC, and thus it is
insufficient for an employee to only report internally.14 Two years later, the Second Circuit turned
the monologue into a conversation when, in Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy, the court held contrary to the
Fifth Circuit.15 The Second Circuit held that an employee qualified for Dodd-Frank retaliation
remedies after reporting wrongdoing internally to his employer and being terminated for that
report.16 While the district courts in the Second and Fifth Circuits have each circuit’s respective
guidance on this matter, the district courts in the rest of the country land are left to their own
devices to sort through 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)’s meaning. Without more circuit courts taking
a stance or the Supreme Court ruling on the issue, district courts will continue to have inconsistent
holdings. That means that courts in agreement with Berman will provide more employees with
remedies under Dodd-Frank, leaving some employees in Asadi-like circuits without such remedies.
The solution for the inconsistent holdings is found in Berman. Employees who report wrongdoing
only internally should be entitled to Dodd-Frank remedies.
II. Background
A. Understanding How We Got Here
The problem regarding the protection of whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank is relatively
recent, as Dodd-Frank itself was enacted nearly six years ago.17 Dodd-Frank implemented sixteen
titles in an effort to secure financial stability.18 The specific title at issue for purposes of this
Comment is Title IX: Investor Protections and Improvements to the Regulation of Securities.

14

Asadi, 720 F.3d at 629.
Berman, 801 F.3d at 153.
16
Id.
17
Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks on 21st Century Financial Regulatory Reform
(June 17, 2009).
18
Id.
15
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Within Title IX, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 is codified as Section 922, which establishes whistleblower
protections.19
Both definitions and rules are included in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6, which jointly develop the
tension within 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). Within 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6, “whistleblower” is defined
as “any individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who provide, information
relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or
regulation, by the Commission.” 20 This definition appears to plainly limit who Dodd-Frank
protects as a whistleblower, by requiring information be provided to the SEC. This seemingly
plain language is in tension with 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A), which outlines the actions that will
be protected under Dodd-Frank.21 This section includes that
[i]n general-- No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass,
directly or indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower
in the terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the
whistleblower—
(i) in providing information to the Commission in accordance with this
section;
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or judicial or
administrative action of the Commission based upon or related to such
information; or
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 [], the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [], including
section 10A(m) of such Act [], section 1513(e) of title 18, United States
Code, and any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of
the Commission.22
The word “whistleblower” is included in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A), and it appears to
connect to subdivision (i), (ii), and (iii) to establish the three scenarios in which Dodd-Frank
remedies are available. 23 Subdivisions (i) and (ii) include language regarding “the Commission”

19

15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h).
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (emphasis added).
21
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).
22
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)
23
Id.
20
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in referencing the requirement that information be provided to the Commission. 24 While
subdivision (iii) also includes the words, “the Commission,” this language is in reference to the
jurisdiction of the SEC, and not explicitly a requirement of information being provided to the
SEC.25
In August 2011, a year after Dodd-Frank’s enactment, the SEC promulgated a rule to
clarify the application of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A):26
[f]or purposes of the anti-retaliation protections afforded by [15 U.S.C. § 78u6(h)(1)] of the Exchange Act [], you are a whistleblower if:
(i) You possess a reasonable belief that the information you are providing
relates to a possible securities law violation (or, where applicable, to a
possible violation of the provisions set forth in 18 U.S.C. 1514A(a)) that
has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur, and;
(ii) You provide that information in a manner described in [15 U.S.C. § 78u6(h)(1)(A)] of the Exchange Act [].27
Although the text of the rule is not explicit, the SEC in its explanation of this rule, stated that 15
U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) includes a category of whistleblowers who are individuals who report
to persons or governmental authorities other than the Commission.28 The SEC’s rule instead added
another layer for interpretation because now courts need to decide not merely the meaning of the
statute in the abstract, but also whether deference should be given to the SEC’s approach.
In August 2015, two years after Asadi and a month before Berman, the SEC issued a more
formal interpretation of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). 29 The SEC began its interpretation by
conceding that the text of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) is ambiguous about who is afforded DoddFrank remedies.30 While considering the statutory definitions of “whistleblower,” in conjunction

24

15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)-(ii)
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)
26
17 C.F.R. 240.21F-2 (2011).
27
Id.
28
76 Fed. Reg. 34300, 34304 (June 13, 2011).
29
90 Fed. Reg. 47829 (Aug. 10, 2015).
30
Id.
25
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with 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A), the SEC spent much effort to resolve the ambiguity: “an
individual who reports internally and suffers employment retaliation will be no less protected than
an individual who comes immediately to the Commission.”31 The SEC reasoned that, from a
policy standpoint, this reading of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) would remove any serious
disincentive to report internally before reporting to the SEC.32 Since this interpretation is recent,
the cases discussed in this Comment do not consider it; however, it is important for this Comment’s
analysis, and may be crucial in a potential future Supreme Court ruling.
B. Dodd-Frank and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
As an additional consideration in understanding how Dodd-Frank aids whistleblowers, 15
U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) mentions the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”), which also has
an anti-retaliation provision.33 This provision prohibits any publicly traded company, or “any
officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company,” from retaliating against
any employee. 34 An employee who is retaliated against for protected disclosures must file a
complaint with the Secretary of Labor no later than 180 days after the alleged violation. 35 An
employee who prevails in a SOX anti-retaliation action is entitled to relief that would “make the
employee whole.”36
SOX’s anti-retaliation provision differs from Dodd-Frank’s provision.

While SOX

requires filing with the Secretary of Labor, individuals may bring a Dodd-Frank claim “without
first filing their claim with a federal agency.”37 The remedies for a prevailing individual under

31

Id. at 47830.
Id.
33
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii).
34
18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2010).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.; Asadi v. G.E. Energy United States, L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013).
32
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Dodd-Frank are generally the same as those under SOX, but Dodd-Frank provides such individual
with two times the amount of back pay owed.38 The 180-day limitation on SOX claims does not
govern Dodd-Frank’s statute of limitations, which instead allows claims to be filed from six to ten
years after the violation.39 These significant differences mean that any suggestion that certain
constructions of Dodd-Frank would render the SOX anti-retaliation provision moot, are
incorrect.40
C. How courts are managing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)
Many district courts have faced the confusion underlying 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).41
The Fifth Circuit became the first circuit court to rule on the issue, in Asadi.42 The Second Circuit
created a circuit split just a few years later in Berman.43
C-1. Asadi v. G.E. Energy United States, L.L.C.
In Asadi, a former employee of GE Energy, Asadi, reported to his supervisors a potential
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) violation.44 Shortly after these internal reports, Asadi
received a negative performance review, was pressured to step down from his position to accept a
reduced role, and, when he did not comply, was fired.45 Asadi did not report to the SEC, but
reported only internally to his superiors.46 Asadi brought suit against GE Energy, asserting that he
was retaliated against for voicing concerns about violations, and was therefore entitled to Dodd-

38

15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)(ii).
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii).
40
See, e.g., Asadi, 720 F.3d at 628; Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Systems, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640, 645–
46 (E.D. Wis. 2014).
41
See, e.g., Asadi, 720 F.3d at 620; Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71945
(S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013); Nollner v. Southern Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (M.D.
Tenn. 2012); Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136939 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012).
42
Asadi, 720 F.3d at 620.
43
Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 153 (2d Cir. 2015).
44
Asadi, 720 F.3d at 621.
45
Id.
46
Id.
39
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Frank’s whistleblower protection. 47

Asadi reasoned that the protection against retaliation

provision should include individuals who take any action that falls within 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(h)(1)(A)(iii), regardless of whether the SEC is provided with information.48 Asadi made this
argument by finding ambiguity in the language of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).49 He conceded that
he was not a whistleblower within 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6’s definition because he did not report to the
SEC, but he contended that the inconsistency of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 “does not necessarily require
disclosure of information to the SEC” for an individual to be protected. 50 The Fifth Circuit
disagreed with Asadi, finding the language unambiguous and requiring an individual to be a
whistleblower, within 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6’s definition, in order to benefit from Dodd-Frank
remedies.51
Faced with statutory interpretation, the court first evaluated whether the text was plain and
unambiguous on its face.52 It so found because the language plainly specified that only defined
whistleblowers were protected for actions that fall within one of the three categories of 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-6(h)(1)(A).53 The court furthered its analysis, by finding that the third category does not
conflict with the definition of “whistleblower,” as it is possible for an individual to take action that
falls within the third category of protected activity, yet, by definition, not be a whistleblower. 54
Because the court found the text to be unambiguous, it found it unnecessary to consider the SEC’s
2011 rule in construing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). 55

The SEC’s rule would broaden the

47

Id.
Id. at 625.
49
Id.
50
Asadi, 720 F.3d at 624.
51
Id. at 630.
52
Id. at 622.
53
Id. at 626.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 629.
48
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definition of “whistleblower,” but, according to the court, that rule is invalid because it is
inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute.56 The court reasoned that Congress directly
spoke on this issue when it decided to use “whistleblower” instead of broader terms, such as
“individual” or “employee” to express who qualified for the remedies. 57

Lastly, the court

contended that, if 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) were to be read according to Asadi, SOX’s antiretaliation provision would become moot because Dodd-Frank’s enhanced remedies would lead
individuals to bring claims under Dodd-Frank, leaving the SOX anti-retaliation irrelevant.58 When
evaluated in totality, the court held that only those who report to the SEC are entitled to remedies
under Dodd-Frank because the text of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) is plain and unambiguous about
such.59
C-2. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC
In the years following Asadi, some district courts followed the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning,
while others could not find justifications to do so.60 The federal circuits split on this issue in
September 2015, when the Second Circuit held 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)’s language
ambiguous.61 A former employee of Neo@Ogilvy, Berman, internally reported various practices
of accounting fraud, and was allegedly terminated as a result of the reporting.62 Six months after
his termination, Berman informed the SEC of the suspected accounting fraud.63 Berman asserted
56

Asadi, 720 F.3d at 629–30.
Id. at 626.
58
Id. at 628–29.
59
Id. at 629.
60
Compare Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Systems, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640, 645–46 (E.D. Wis. 2014)
(holding that one must report to the SEC under all three prongs of the anti-retaliation provision in order to
be protected); Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (finding the anti-retaliation
provision unambiguous); with Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 153 (2d Cir. 2015) (Chevron
deference should be given because of the statute’s ambiguity); Dressler v. Lime Energy, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 106532 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2015) (finding Dodd-Frank’s inconsistent language as ambiguous).
61
Berman, 801 F.3d at 153.
62
Id. at 149.
63
Id.
57
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similar arguments as Asadi, claiming 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) is ambiguous and allows for
whistleblower protection for individuals who report violations internally and not to the SEC before
termination.64 The court, unlike in Asadi, agreed with this contention and held that individuals
who reported internally are entitled to Dodd-Frank remedies.65
In reaching its conclusion, the court engaged in a more extensive version of statutory
interpretation as compared to Asadi.66 Following the guidance of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., a landmark case that stated the process of determining whether
to grant deference to a government agency’s interpretation of a statute that agency administered,
the Berman court first concluded that the text of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) is ambiguous in
expressing Congress’s intent.67 The text is ambiguous because otherwise “there would be virtually
no situation where an SEC reporting requirement would leave subdivision (iii) with any scope.”68
Further, some employees, specifically attorneys and auditors, are required to report internally
before reporting to the SEC, leaving them little, if anything, to gain from Dodd-Frank under the
contrary interpretation.69 The court reasoned that Congress did not intend this limitation, rather
had simply enacted an unclear bill.70 The lack of legislative history for subdivision (iii) of 15
U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) suggest that this subdivision was inserted when the House and Senate
bills were hastily reconciled,71 leaving unnoticed the lack of logic in the relationship of the two
sections.72 The court reasoned that it was unlikely that the subdivision was intended to lead to an

64

Id.
Id. at 155.
66
Id. at 151.
67
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Berman, 801 F.3d at 149 n.2.
68
Berman, 801 F.3d at 152.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 155.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 154.
65
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extremely limited scope.73 Ultimately, the court found the SEC’s regulation to be a reasonable
interpretation of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) and deferred to it in holding that Berman was
entitled to pursue Dodd-Frank remedies.74
D. Relevant Approaches to Statutory Interpretation
At the heart of this circuit split is the issue of statutory interpretation. Courts are essentially
divided on whether the text of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) is ambiguous, and because that answer
is unclear, courts’ holdings are inconsistent.75 While the Asadi Court approached the evaluation
of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) with a textualist lens, the Berman Court looked beyond the text and
based its decision on the purpose and practicality of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).76 These varying
approaches to statutory interpretation in a variety of contexts have caused tension within the
judicial system for decades.77
Textualism emphasizes the importance of the words Congress chose when it wrote the
statute.78 Textualists interpret statutes with the presumption that Congress “invariably legislates
against the background of a number of linguistic and cultural understandings that influence, and
indeed determine, what a linguistically competent person would understand a statute to say.”79
Textualists argue against the use of legislative history because they think this history is not a
reliable indicator of the legislature’s intent.80
73

Id. at 155.
Berman, 801 F.3d at 155.
75
Asadi v. G.E. Energy United States, L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 629 (5th Cir. 2013); Berman, 801 F.3d at
155.
76
Asadi, 720 F.3d at 629; Berman, 801 F.3d at 155.
77
Richard M. Re, The New Holy Trinity, 18 Green Bag 2D 407 (2015),
http://www.greenbag.org/v18n4/v18n4_articles_re.pdf.
78
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Note, Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist Theories of
Statutory Interpretation—and the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment within Both, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 685, 707 (2014).
79
Id. at 685.
80
See Michael Dorf, Justice Scalia’s King v. Burwell Dissent Degrades His Textualist “Brand”, DORF ON
LAW (June 25, 2015), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2015/06/justice-scalias-king-v-burwell-dissent.html.
74
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On the other hand, purposivism looks beyond the text to plausible purposes of the statute.81
While text remains important, purposivists utilize this process because they assume “that the
legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.”

82

Unlike textualists, purposivists will sometimes examine legislative history to find evidence of
Congress’s intent.83 According to purposivists, “judges should construe statutory language to
fulfill [the] purposes” Congress intended to reach. 84

These different views on statutory

interpretation suggest the possibility of inconsistent decisions.
E. The Current Form of Statutory Interpretation
For over a century, a purposivist framework guided the Supreme Court, in response to the
Court’s 1892 decision in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States.85 The Court in this case held
that it could not look only to the literal terms of a statute because, when applied with the case’s
facts, that approach yielded a result that Congress was unlikely to have intended.86 In the last two
decades, this trend has been greatly criticized in favor of a more textualist approach.87 Instead of
taking a hard stance for one approach as opposed to the other, the Supreme Court has done some
melding. 88 The Court’s latest approach may be coined the “textually-structured purposivism
approach,” as the Court considers text, purpose, and pragmatism when clarifying statutory
ambiguity.89 The Court’s current trend keeps both textualism and purposivism in mind.

81

See Note, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 704 (2014).
Id.
83
Id.
84
John F. Manning, Article: The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113 (2011).
85
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
86
Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 150 (2d Cir. 2015).
87
The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113.
88
Id. at 119.
89
Id.; Richard M. Re, The New Holy Trinity, 18 Green Bag 2D 407, 421 (2015),
http://www.greenbag.org/v18n4/v18n4_articles_re.pdf.
82
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The Supreme Court’s recent inclination for melding textualism and purposivism is
exemplified in three of its recent decisions. 90 In King v. Burwell, the Court was faced with
interpreting the phrase “established by a state” in a provision regarding income tax subsidies for
health exchanges in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.91 The issue was whether this
phrase also included the federal government, which would have broadened its meaning.92 The
Court found for the broader interpretation in order to further the Act’s intent.93 The Court reasoned
that the “most natural reading” of “established by a state” would eliminate the existence of
“‘qualified individuals’ on Federal Exchanges.”94 This result in turn would undermine another
provision

in

the

Act,

which

contemplates

“there

will

be

qualified

individuals on every Exchange.”95 The Court determined that without qualified individuals, an
Exchange would not be able accomplish its purpose. 96 In essence, the Court reasoned this
narrower interpretation would have destroyed the provision of the Act, and therefore the Court
favored the broader interpretation.
In Yates v. United States, the Court was also faced with interpreting a phrase’s meaning,
specifically “tangible object.” 97 The issue was whether “fish” was included in the scope of
“tangible object.”98 The Court considered the purpose of the statute in which the phrase was found,
and ultimately did not apply the ordinary meaning of the phrase.99 The Court considered the words

90

The New Holy Trinity, 18 Green Bag 2D 407 (discussing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015);
Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1077 (2015); Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014)).
91
King, 135 S. Ct. at 2490.
92
Id. at 2491.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1079 (2015).
98
Id.
99
Id. at 1082.
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surrounding the phrase and the title in which the phrase was found, to determine that the phrase
should apply only in the financial context of SOX.100 If the Court had applied a broader meaning,
it could have created a “coverall spoliation of [an] evidence statute.”101 The Court reasoned that
the statutory purpose and context of the phrase conflicted with the phrase’s ordinary meaning,
requiring the Court to resolve the ambiguity with a narrow interpretation.102
In Bond v. United States, the Court declined to apply the definition of “chemical weapon”
to a toxic chemical for the matter at bar.103 The Court limited the statute’s scope because a broader
reading of the phrase would have gone beyond the statute’s purpose of enhancing national security,
and would have intruded upon state criminal jurisdiction. 104 Specifically, the Court was faced
with a unique set of facts of a woman who covered her ex-husband’s car with chemicals, and was
subsequently prosecuted under the federal Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act.105
The Court held that the Act was not implemented with the purpose of covering local criminal
activity.106 By construing the phrase narrowly, the Court protected the application of traditional
state criminal jurisdiction.107
In each of these cases, the Supreme Court found textual ambiguity, allowing it to move
away from a strict textualist approach.108 Notably, however, the finding of ambiguity did not result
solely from the text, because “purposive and pragmatic reasons” also suggested ambiguity.109 This

100

Id. at 1079.
Id. at 1088.
102
Id. at 1086.
103
Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2092 (2014).
104
Id. at 2093.
105
Id. at 2088.
106
Id. at 2093-94.
107
Id. at 2088.
108
Richard M. Re, The New Holy Trinity, 18 Green Bag 2D 407, 409 (2015),
http://www.greenbag.org/v18n4/v18n4_articles_re.pdf.
109
Id.
101
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suggests that courts need to further their understanding of Congress’s intent when interpreting
statutes and their provisions.110 These three Supreme Court decisions may have no direct impact
for deciding how to resolve who is entitled to whistleblower protection remedies under DoddFrank; however, they suggest a methodology that would cut in favor of the Berman approach and
aid in predicting how the Supreme Court may decide who might benefit from the whistleblower
protection provision.
F. What this means for Employers, Employees, and the Federal Circuits
Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protection, through 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1), works in
conjunction with the SEC’s whistleblower incentive program, to protect whistleblowers from
retaliation. 111 Thus, the SEC directly incentivizes individuals to blow the whistle about any
violations of securities laws, and in return, the SEC will protect those individuals.112 With the
circuits split about who is protected, individuals, in circuits other than the Second, may seriously
hesitate to report to their company, as they may be unsure of what protections they would be
entitled.113 In the Fifth Circuit, potential whistleblowers are incentivized to go public rather than
give their companies an opportunity to correct the problem. For employers, this split has a
significant impact on how a business should operate because the importance of avoiding retaliation
claims is heightened.114 Internal reporting incentivizes employers to adhere to internal compliance
programs, remedy conduct before any violation actually occurs, and correct misunderstandings.115
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Employers may also be well-advised to read Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision broadly
because the circuit split may persist and there is no knowing of what side other circuits will come
out on.116
Until the United States Supreme Court rules on whom it finds to be appropriately entitled
to the Dodd-Frank remedies, employees and employers will continue to live in a world that lacks
clarity for Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower protection. Unfortunately, this split will not be resolved
soon. On October 14, 2015, the Second Circuit stayed the issuance of its mandate in Berman;
however, on November 10, 2015, the defendant advised the Second Circuit that it would not be
petitioning for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.117
III. Analysis
The holdings in Asadi and Berman are directly contradictory. Asadi narrowly applies 15
U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) by not affording internal reporter protection and Berman applies it
broadly, by affording that protection.118 This Comment argues that the broad interpretation in
Berman best comports with congressional intent, policy, and application.
The analysis for determining the deference of an agency’s interpretation was supplied by
the Supreme Court in its landmark decision Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council.119 Time and time again, the Court has applied this decision, and its two-step analysis will
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be utilized as a partial framework for this Comment’s argument.120 Chevron’s two-step test first
begins with inquiring, “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”121
If Congress’s intent is clear, then the language does not require further interpretation and can be
applied accordingly. 122 Step two of the test is not necessary in this scenario. If the court
determines, however, that Congress has not directly spoken to the precise question at issue, the
court must utilize step two of Chevron.123 In that event, the court must determine whether the
agency’s interpretation is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.”124
The determination of “a permissible construction” is controlled by whether there is an
interpretive gap, implicitly or explicitly left by Congress for the agency to fill.125 That, of course,
is the thrust of step one. If Congress explicitly left such a gap, the agency’s “legislative regulations
are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute.”126 If Congress implicitly left the gap, a court may not substitute its own interpretation for
a reasonable interpretation by an agency.127 The rationale for this distinction is that Congress may
use “capacious terms when it wishes to enlarge, agency discretion.”128 This second part of the
two-step test occurs because the statute is either silent or ambiguous regarding a specific issue.129
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The Asadi court found 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) unambiguous, and thus truncated its
analysis at Chevron’s first step.130 The Berman court continued to Chevron’s second step when it
found 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) ambiguous.131 Ambiguity is the beginning of the inquiry.
A. Ambiguity
The Second and Fifth Circuit Courts split at the first step of the Chevron two-step analysis
because these circuit courts have opposing views on whether the text of the protection against
retaliation provision is ambiguous. 132 Following the Supreme Court’s recent trend towards a
textually structured purposivist approach, the combination of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)’s text,
purpose, and pragmatic use will lead the Court to find ambiguity.
The text of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) is ambiguous on its face and through its
application. It is facially ambiguous because it does not include the words “to the Commission,”
as the other two categories require, and furthermore, it includes other acts and statutes in which
disclosures are required or protected.133 Under these other acts and statutes, internal reporting may
be protected.134 Through its application, it is unclear how a retaliated against employee can receive
protection.
The Supreme Court should evaluate 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) with a purposivist
approach in mind, which would require that it be broadly interpreted. Dodd-Frank was enacted to
“promote financial stability . . . by improving accountability and transparency in the financial
system.” 135 Dodd-Frank implemented 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) as an amendment to the
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934.136 The purpose of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was
“[t]o provide for the regulation of securities exchanges and of over-the-counter markets . . . to
prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such exchanges and markets, and for other
purposes.”137 Thus, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) should be read in accordance with these purposes.
If the Supreme Court were to read 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) narrowly, by considering
only the words within the four corners of the page, the Court would fail to further the purposes of
these acts. Textualists argue that the text speaks for itself and that the definition of “whistleblowers”
within 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 sufficiently provides for who is protected.138 The textualist approach,
however, does not address the statutory gap, leading to 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)’s ambiguity.
The application of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) does not “follow[] directly from the plain language
of” subdivision (iii); and instead the plain language leaves the matter unclear.139 The Supreme
Court previously held that a statute’s clear definition should not be used if doing so would violate
the statute’s congressional intent.140 To read a statute in accordance with congressional intent, it
must be “recognize[ed] that ‘Congress legislates against the backdrop’ of certain unexpressed
presumptions.”141 Thus, if a statute’s definition does not comport with the backdrop in which the
statute was created, this definition does not assist in interpreting the statute. Thus, the Court
suggested that ambiguity should not be evaluated exclusively based on the text, but also through
the statute’s pragmatic application and purpose.142
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Understanding Congress’s intent, through 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)’s legislative history
furthers the argument that ambiguity exists within the statute. This inquiry begins with the Obama
Administration’s proposal to Congress. This proposal broadly supports making whole employees
retaliated against because they provided information to the Commission. 143 The House of
Representatives passed the Administration’s proposal, specifying that 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)
should prohibit retaliation against an employee for “providing information to the Commission.”144
The House’s proposal did not include the word “whistleblower,” and instead used “employee.”145
Furthermore, the section did not have a specific subdivision to define the three categories currently
available. 146 The Senate version of this bill substituted “whistleblower for “employee”” and
specified that a whistleblower would be protected “(i) in providing information to the Commission
in accordance with subsection (b); or (ii) in assisting in any investigation or judicial or
administrative action of the Commission based upon or related to such information.”147 Still the
Senate’s version lacked any mention of the third category. To this point, then, it might fairly be
said that Congress was concerned only with reports to the SEC. The third category, however,
appeared for the first time in the House Conferees’ conference base text, added after the first and
second categories.148 The question then is, what effect the addition of this category was intended
to have on the overall provision, and it seems certain that it was intended to broaden the thrust of
the statute. One way in which that could be achieved is reading subdivision (iii) to reach internal
disclosures.149
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Dodd-Frank was enacted less than a month after the addition of subdivision (iii), leaving
no further indication of the subdivision’s intended purpose.150 Because legislative history fails to
provide the intended purpose of subdivision (iii), the only purposes that are related to this
subdivision are the purposes of Dodd-Frank and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The
addition of subdivision (iii) was a last minute attempt to reconcile the House and Senate bills.151
This attempt resulted with a provision that does not fit well with the statute’s definition of
“whistleblower.”152 It is unclear whether the conferees intended subdivision (iii)’s incorporation
to be limited by the definition of “whistleblower” or to protect employees who report internally,
without reporting to the Commission.153 Thus, the text and legislative history result in ambiguity,
noting this possibility because “[t]rue ambiguity is almost always the result of carelessness or
inattention.”154
Dodd-Frank was enacted with the purpose of transparency in the financial system, and
implemented whistleblower protection to fulfill this purpose. 155 By limiting whistleblower
protection to only individuals who report to the SEC, courts hinder Dodd-Frank’s purpose.
Transparency in the financial system may also include the transparency of a company. Thus,
courts should encourage employees to first raise concerns about possible securities violations to
their companies, furthering the methods of transparency. A company could then conduct an
investigation, remedy the problem, and avoid any unnecessary governmental interference.156 The
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Supreme Court’s current trend of determining ambiguity based on considerations of text, purpose,
and pragmatic use suggests that 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) is ambiguous.
B. SEC Deference
Chevron commands that courts not attempt to resolve the ambiguity by themselves, and
instead should defer to the SEC’s interpretation of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). There is no serious
question of the SEC’s competency and authority to interpret Dodd-Frank as the protection against
retaliation provision within Dodd-Frank is also an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act.157
Courts do, however, need to determine that the SEC’s interpretation is permissible.158 The hasty
addition of subdivision (iii) suggests that Congress implicitly left the gap in 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(h)(1)(A). Accordingly, courts “may not substitute [their] own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”159 Applying
the SEC’s interpretation is a permissible measure in order to sort through the ambiguity.
As suggested earlier, the SEC has given some guidance over the last few years, with its
most recent interpretation of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) in August 2015.160 This interpretation,
along with the SEC’s previous rule in August 2011, should be given deference by courts, as the
statute is ambiguous and Congress implicitly left a gap. The SEC’s August 2011 rule specifies the
requirements to be considered a whistleblower.161 No part of the agency’s text requires reporting
to the Commission. Instead, the SEC classifies a whistleblower as someone who has “a reasonable
belief” of a possible securities law violation, and that information be provided in a manner
proscribed in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). 162 This section comprises of the three possible
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whistleblower protection categories, including subdivision (iii), which has no mention of providing
information “to the Commission.” 163

Therefore, the SEC reads the statute as making it

unnecessary for an individual to report to the SEC in order to receive whistleblower protection
remedies.
The SEC’s August 2015 interpretation supports the goals of the whistleblower program
and reaffirms its previous August 2011 rule.164 By affording protection to individuals who report
internally, the interpretation explains that the SEC “avoids a two-tiered structure of employment
retaliation protection that might discourage some individuals from first reporting internally . . . and
thus, jeopardize the investor-protection and law-enforcement benefits that can result from internal
reporting.” 165 The interpretation looks beyond language to policy. Thus, the SEC’s rule and
interpretation, supplement what Congress failed to do.
The consideration of policy includes employers, employees, and the government as
potential victims of the ambiguous language of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). Employee protection
for internal reporting is likely to encourage companies to design “robust compliance procedures,”
limiting possible claims of securities violations.166 This would make for stronger companies, and
more effective companies nationwide. If an internal whistleblower is not afforded the same
protection as an employee who reports to the SEC, the employee will not be incentivized to report
internally. Accordingly, internal reporting will inevitably decline, leading to the possibility of
more external reports.167 By protecting internal reporting, the government would greatly benefit.
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Instead of the SEC being bombarded with futile claims, the SEC will receive “fewer and higher
quality reports.”168 This will aid in preserving limited government funds and resources, so that the
SEC can focus on “the most salient employee accusations,” instead of baseless ones.169
Further, affording internal reporters protection relieves courts of the need to split
employees into two groups—lawyers/auditors and non-lawyers/non-auditors. Lawyers and
auditors are not allowed to report the SEC without first reporting to the company.170 Thus, if SEC
reporting were required, this large group of employees would never receive protection under
Dodd-Frank.
The SEC’s view on 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) allows for the anti-retaliation provision’s
protections to extend to those who make disclosures that are protected under SOX, whether or not
the disclosures were made to the SEC.171 Opponents of the broad reading of 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(h)(1)(A) argue that this reading would render the SOX anti-retaliation provision moot, and
Congress could not have intended the agency to ignore this fact. 172 The argument asserts that if
all SOX protected activity falls within the protection of Dodd-Frank, then all SOX claimants would
file under Dodd-Frank.173 Claimants, regardless of the SEC reporting requirements, would not
necessarily favor Dodd-Frank over SOX because SOX provides successful plaintiffs with
monetary damages unavailable under Dodd-Frank.174 While the wording of subdivision (iii) may
have been hastily added, Congress intended to provide protection for internal reports of SOX
violations, within this provision. 175 In effect, to limit 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) would
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“effectively invalidate [subdivision (iii)’s] protection of whistleblower disclosures that do not
require reporting to SEC.”176 It does not follow that Congress would have included SOX in 15
U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii), only to limit its use.
IV. Conclusion
The protection against retaliation provision is intended to help and assist persons, who have
knowledge of potential securities violations, make the decision to report his or her beliefs. More
angst than clarity has resulted from the implementation of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A), because it
is unclear how it should be applied. Protecting only persons who report to SEC could not have
been within Congress’s intent when it included 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). Regardless of this
fact, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) is ambiguous, both on its face and through its application. This
ambiguity is best understood when considering the text, purpose, and pragmatic use of 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-6(h)(1)(A).
While a court may often implement its own interpretation of a statute, when an appropriate
agency has developed a rule or interpretation of the statute, the court must determine if that rule or
interpretation is permissible. Here, the SEC interpretation of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) is
permissible as it is a reasonable resolution of a statutory ambiguity. The SEC plainly and
unambiguously provides that individuals who only report internally, and not to the SEC, are
entitled to whistleblower protection remedies under Dodd-Frank. This is the best solution to
answering the question of who can receive benefits for reporting potential securities violations. If
other circuit courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, follow this analysis and solution, employers,
employees, and the government will reap the benefits.
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